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GIFTS OF BANK DEPOSITS
HAROLD C. HAVIGHURST*
Although the legal problems in connection with gifts of bank de-
posits have much in common with those involving gifts of other kinds
of property, it would seem that the special characteristics of such de-
posits and the independent development of devices for their gratuitous
transfer justify a separate treatment.
The usual case involves the attempt to make a disposal of the deposit
with death in mind. The reasons for making a gift rather than a will
are many. The donor suddenly confronted with the possibility of death
and without legal advice may take the most obvious course to accomplish
his purpose. If he has time for deliberation, he may not wish to have
his property pass by will because of a prejudice against wills, courts and
lawyers, or a desire to avoid the expenses of administration.' He may
feel that a will becomes known to the public whereas he desires secrecy
in order to avoid the disclosure of questionable relationships with the
beneficiary, to prevent dissatisfaction on the part of other aspirants for
bounty who receive a small share, or for other reasons.2 There is also
the possibility that his purpose is to defeat the right of a spouse to a
share in the property which cannot be taken away by will because of the
election generally given.3 Infrequently, as far as bank deposits are con-
cerned, there is the desire to avoid inheritance taxation.
The recited circumstances show that sometimes it is not improper to
characterize such a gift as "the poor man's will". Doubtless the sym-
pathetic currents generated by the idea behind the phrase have had-their
effect on courts and legislatures and are partially responsible for the
disordered state of legal theory in this field. Further difficulty and con-
fusion is also traceable to the fact that, in the words of Sir William
Holdsworth, "a branch of the law which comes at the meeting place of
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. For valuable aid in the search
for materials and in the preparation of the article, the writer is indebted to Leo
Freedman, J. D. Northwestern University, 1933, now Attorney for the Illinois
Commerce Commission.
'Cases are very numerous that disclose these purposes. A good example is
Howard v. Dingley, 122 Me. 5, 118 AtI. 592 (1922), recounting the testimony of a
witness, "He had made a will, and then he thought that would have to be admin-
istered on, so much red tape gone through: he decided to have them put into bank
books."
'See Williams v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 51 App. Div. -332, 64 N. Y. Supp.
1021 (2d Dept. 1900).
'See Schmitt v. Schmitt, 39 Ohio App. 219, 177 N. E. 478 (1928), where the
'court says, "Having in mind the unhappy relations between himself and his wife,
... he set his wits to working as to whether or not he could devise some way in
which to deprive her of what the law would allow her as his widow."
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the law of property and the law of obligation can never be anything but
difficult to formulate and apply".
4
Savings accounts are more frequently the subject of gifts than are
checking accounts. 5 Nevertheless gifts of deposits of the latter type are
not unknown and most of the problems involved are common to both.
A few distinctions based upon the nature of the deposit will appear in
the course of the discussion. Where a specific problem relates to only
one type of deposit, that will be pointed out.
It is to be noted that in some instances a transaction partaking of the
nature of a gift may not be classed as such, if a consideration for the
transfer moving from the claimant is discoverable. Services rendered
by the recipient often provides the basis for such a finding.0 However
it will usually be impossible to invoke the doctrine without more labor-
ing with the facts than a court is willing to undertake. 7 The claimant
must then rely on the theory of an executed gift, a declaration of trust
or a contract between the alleged donor and the bank for his benefit.
Whatever the theory, it is necessary to show that the alleged donor
intended that the claimant should have the beneficial interest in the de-
posit. In addition it must appear that legal requirements as to form
have been satisfied or for some reason dispensed with. Since the subject
of the gift is intangible the usual requirement of delivery of the property
itself cannot be complied with. It may be possible, however, to find an
equivalent of delivery or to establish a trust or a contract. Finally the
statute of wills must be considered.
I. INTENT
The important question of intent must be taken into account at every
stage of the discussion, but a few general observations on this subject
may be made at the outset.
'7 HouswoTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1925) 544.
'The following observations of the court in In re Wilkins' Will, 131 Misc. 188.
226 N. Y. Supp. 415 (Surr. Ct. 1928), are of interest: "A savings bank is entirely
different from a commercial bank in its foundation, its place in the social structure,
and in its method of business. A savings bank is an institution for the accumula-
tion of small sums, chiefly the savings of the poorer classes .... The chief prob-
lem of a savings bank is the safe-keeping of funds .... When deposits are made
in checking accounts in commercial banks, there is no thought that it is there as
the poor man's will."
'Gostina v. Whitham, 148 Wash. 72, 268 Pac. 132 (1928). In one case the
extension of an agreement to marry 'was deemed a consideration. Whitehouse v.
Whitehouse, 90 Me. 468, 38 Atl. 374 (1897) (donor and donee had already been
engaged for seventeen years). In Bainbridge v. Hoes, 163 App. Div. 870, 149
N. Y. Supp. 20 (2d Dept. 1914), the donor sent his fiancee a check just prior to
suicide. The court in denying recovery on the theory of a gift suggests that there
might be a remedy upon a contract.
" Services rendered by wife are regarded as her duty. Consequently it may be
impossible to regard a wife's services as consideration. See Foxworthy v. Adams,
136 Ky. 403, 124 S. W. 381 (1910); Vercher v. Roy, 171 La. 524, 131 So. 658
(1930).
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The intent issue is one of peculiar difficulty due to the fact that it
so frequently happens that persons without any design to benefit another
often make use of a device having the appearance of a gift to accomplish
some other purpose. Thus property may be placed under the ostensible
ownership of another to facilitate the securing of expense money for
travel,8 or during infirmity," to conceal the fact of ownership from
others, 10 to avoid the inconvenience of personal appearance with the
bank book to effect a withdrawal," to maintain amounts in a single sav-
ings bank in excess of the maximum amount permitted by statute or by-
laws of the bank,'2 or to obtain a higher rate of interest where the by-
laws or statutes provide for interest only on accounts of limited
amounts, or which graduate the interest rate inversely to the amount
deposited. 13 The transfer of property for the purpose of defeating
creditors would also fall within this classification. These purposes may
often be mingled with the intention to make a gift either at once or in
the future.
The determination of the issue requires a rather broad consideration
of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Declarations of
the alleged donor may not be testified to by the claimant if the donor is
dead, as is usually the case, by virtue of the rule disqualifying a party
from testifying against the estate of a deceased person.14 Such evidence
given by third persons is, however, admissible. 15 Important also are
the state of affection between donor and claimant, the worthiness of the
latter and services performed although under circumstances negativing
a contractual relationship.' 0 The comparative need of the beneficiaries
'Bradford v. Eastman, 229 Mass. 499, 118 N. E. 879 (1918).
' Matter of Bolin, 136 N. Y. 177, 32 N. E. 626 (1892).
1" Eaton v. Blood, 201 Iowa 834, 208 N. W. 508 (1926).
'Bender v. Cleveland Trust C9., 123 Ohio St 588, 176 N. E. 452 (1931).
' Schick v. Grote, 42 N. J. Eq. 352, 7 Atl. 852. (Prerog. Ct 1886).Cleveland v. Hampden Savings Bank, 182 Mass. 110, 65 N. E. 27 (1902).
Most of the motives here mentioned are enumerated by Andrews, J., in Beaver v.
Beaver, 117 N. Y. 421, 430-31, 22 N. E. 940, 942 (1889).
1 1 WiGmo, EvIDENcE (2d. ed. 1923) §488; Burns v. Nolette, 83 N. H. 489,
144 Atl. 848 (1929) ; Flanagan v. Nash, 185 Pa. 41, 39 Atl. 818 (1898). If the
donor is living he may testify as to his intent and the claimant may also testify as
to his declarations. Frank v. Heiman, 302 Mo. 334, 258 S. W. 1000 (1924);
People's Savings Bank v. Webb, 21 R. I. 218, 42 Atl. 874 (1899) ; Declarations of
the depositor made after the time of the alleged gift are not admissible. 2 WiG-
moRE, EVIDENCE (2d. ed. 1923) §1085; Tierney v. Fitzpatrick, 195 N. Y. 433, 88
N. E. 750 (1909).
1 Such evidence was relied upon in Ladner v. Ladner, 128 Miss. 75, 90 So. 593
(1922) and Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321, 54 Atl. 994 (1903). It is some-
times said that intent and delivery must be proved by clear and conviring
evidence. Denigan v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Society, 127 Cal. 137, 59 Pac. 389
(1899) ; First National Bank of Lyndhurst v. Rutherford Trust Co., 109 N. J. Eq.
265, 157 Atl. 142 (Ct. Ch. 1931).
"0 Laing v. Durand, 84 N. J. Eq. 404, 93 Atl. 884 (Ct. Ch. 1915); Saba v.
Cleveland Trust Co., 23 Ohio App. 163, 154 N. E. 799 (1926).
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of the estate and the claimant undoubtedly has some bearing on the
determination, and is conceivably relevant to the issue apart from its
appeal to sympathy.17
The most valuable evidence to defeat intent is that showing a pur-
pose other than that of benefiting the claimant. In the absence of such
evidence if other circumstances indicate that the claimant is undeserving
the party seeking to defeat the gift may urge fraud, undue influence or
incapacity.'8 Under these issues which are really phases of intent, much
of the same evidence is relevant. In addition the mental condition of
the alleged donor becomes the subject of inquiry.
The form of the transaction itself affords some indication of intent.
This often receives recognition in rules as to prima facie evidence and
presumption. There is little indication apart from legislation, however,
of a policy such as that which lies behind the parol evidence rule that
might lead a court to make certain acts conclusive.' 9 Although intent
may be defeated if the requisite form is lacking, no amount of form
can prevent the defeat of the gift if intent is lacking. In other words
the issue has been kept on a subjective basis.
II. FORmAL REQUIREMENTS
The acts of the alleged donor which have been relied upon to meet
requirements as to form are (1) delivery of a symbol of the deposit,
(2) assignment, (3) deposit in the name of claimant, (4) deposit in
trust for the claimant, (5) deposit in the name of the alleged donor and
claimant.
20
Delivery of a Symbol of the Deposit.
Delivery is the time-honored requirement for a complete gift. Based
upon a popular conception, it has received judicial approval both be-
cause it often serves an administrative purpose and because it gives to a
benevolently minded person a locus penitentiae to which he is deemed
entitled. The first is more important after the donor is dead, the second
'*Estate of Belgard, 202 Iowa 1356, 212 N. W. 116 (1927). For a complete
discussion of the types of evidence admissible to show intention to create a trust,
see Bogert, The Creation of Trusts by Means of Bank Deposits (1916) 1 CORN.
L. Q. 159. Most of the discussion is applicable to the question of intention gen-
erally.
18Lovejoy v. Hart, 30 Cal. App. 664, 159 Pac. 170 (1916); Walso v. Latterner,
143 Minn. 364, 173 N. W. 711 (1919) ; Conners v. Murphy, 100 N. J. Eq. 280, 134
AtI. 681 (1926); Lefurgy v. Lefurgy, 183 App. Div. 502, 169 N. Y. Supp. 970 (2d.
Dept. 1918).
" It has been held, however, that if the depositor and claimant execute an agree-
ment in a formal manner establishing joint ownership, parol evidence of a different
intent is inadmissible. Kennedy v. McMurray, 169 Cal. 287, 146 Pac. 647 (1915).
20 A hybrid of (4) and (5) is in use in Maryland-a deposit in the name of the
depositor, in trust for himself and another jointly. See Milholland v. Whalen, 89
Md. 212, 43 AtI. 43 (1899) ; Foschia v. Foschia, 158 Md. 69, 148 AtI. 121 (1930).
See infra note 82.
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while he lives. The application of the doctrine and the exceptions to it
have been affected by these two basic considerations.
21
The delivery of a symbol of the deposit is the method used ordinarily
in an emergency where the depositor is acting without legal advice. A
common instance is the delivery of a pass book of a savings account.
Such a pass book provides a presumably accurate statement of the con-
dition of the account; all transactions are entered thereon; savings banks
require its presentation for deposits and withdrawals; it is regarded as
a valuable instrument and does not readily pass into the hands of
another without the owner's knowledge. These are the characteristics
that make it a symbol of control over the fund and have led to the
general rule that the delivery of such a pass book with the proper intent
completes the gift.
22
In dealing with checking accounts, we find that the courts have taken
a different view. The delivery of the deposit book for such an account
is not sufficient to meet the formal requirements for a gift.23 This dis-
tinction is prompted by the fact that the deposit book for a hecking
account is not regarded as of value, and care is not ordinarily taken to
keep it in a safe place. Although the book is lost or in the possession
of another, the depositor's right to withdraw money is not affected. The
distinction is thus explainable and based on a sound policy. Naturally
it has sometimes served to defeat a worthy claimant and the donor's
intention as shown by reliable evidence. In Goodson v'. LiIes24 the
donor in the same transaction delivered a savings bank book and a
deposit book for a checking account to the claimant, with unquestionably
the same intent. The court, nevertheless, upheld the gift of the savings
deposit and not the other. Also in Szabo v. SpeckmanP5 the claimant
See Philip Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and
of Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments (1926) 21 ILL. L. REV.
341, 457, 568.
1 I Wn.LIsxoN, CONTRAcTS (1920) §439, and cases cited. A recent case is
Brooks v. Mitchell, 163 Md. 1, 161 Ati. 261 (1932). The fact that the bank has a
by-law requiring a draft or power of attorney in addition to the pass book to
accompany withdrawals has generally been held not to affect the validity of a gift
by delivery of the pass book alone. Ridden v. Thrall, 125 N. Y. 572, 26 N. E.
627 (1891). Cf. the question of the effect of the delivery of a negotiable instrument
without indorsement, infra notes 27 and 28. It may also be noted that symbolic
delivery has been extended to include the delivery of a key to the box where the
pass book is kept. Snidow v. Brotherton, 140 Va. 187, 124 S. E. 182 (1924). A
note to this case in 40 A. L. R. 1249 reviews the cases on the subject of gifts of
savings accounts by delivery of the pass book.
'Jones v. Weakley, 99 Ala. 441, 12 So. 420 (1892) ; Szabo v- Speckman, 73
Fla. 374, 74 So. 411 (1917) ; Simpkins v. Old Colony Trust Co., 254 Mass. 576, 151
N. E. 87 (1926); Pace v. Pace, 107 Miss. 292, 65 So. 273 (1914); Appeal off
Walsh, 122 Pa. 177, 15 Atl. 470 (1888) ; Thomas v. Lewis, 89 Va. 1, 15 S. E. 389(1892)."209 Ala. 335, 96 So' 262 (1923).
173 Fla. 374, 74 So. 411 (1917), cited note 23, supra.
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to whom the deposit book had been delivered had a good reason to ex-
pect a gratuity because of the donor's affection and the services rendered
during his illness. The intent was clear, yet twenty-seven distant rel-
atives were allowed to divide the property.
The delivery of a certificate of deposit, if properly indorsed, of
course completes the gift.26 Even if there is no indorsement the de-
cisions are quite uniform to the effect that such delivery is sufficient.
27
This is in accord with the general rule applicable to negotiable instru-
ments.28
When the donor gives his own check a more difficult problem is
presented. From the standpoint of guarding against fraud the delivery
of a check is fully as satisfactory as the other methods of symbolic de-
livery mentioned. Indeed a check payable to the donee and signed by
the donor affords a far greater assurance of the fact that the donor
intended to make a gift.29 To uphold it would be perfectly in accord
with lay notions, and there are numerous cases where this method has
been used. Here again we are dealing with checking accounts. But this
fact can hardly account for the view generally held that a valid gift can-
not be made by the mere delivery of a check.3 0 This is almost entirely
the result of the operation of the "legal mind". 3 ' The requirement of
consideration provides a defense against an action on a promissory note
delivered as a gift. Since payment on a check may be refused by the
bank and the payee's sole recourse is against the drawer, it may appear
to be indistinguishable. That it should seem like the delivery of some-
' Cases are collected in Note (1926) 40 A. L. tt 508, 509.
'Mellor v. Bank of Willows, 173 Cal. 454, 160 Pac. 567 (1916); Nelson v.
Olson, 108 Minn. 109, 121 N. W. 609 (1909); Rosenau v. Merchants' National
Bank, 56 N. D. 123, 216 N. W. 335 (1927). See also Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S.
602, 2 Sup. Ct. 415, 27 L. ed. 500 (1883).
' Paris v. Stone, 14 Pick. 198 (Mass. 1833) ; Corle v. Monkhouse, 50 N. J. Eq.
537, 25 Atl. 157 (Ct. Ch. 1892). Section 49 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
does not cover this question, being applicable by its terms only to transfers for
value. A very few cases hold that under this section a gratuitous transferee
secures no rights. See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT LAW ANNOrATED (5th
ed. 1932) 472-473, where the position is taken that this is erroneous, citing for the
correct view in accord with the cases cited above, Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v.
Leonard Watch Co., 249 Mass. 14, 143 N. E. 827 (1924). It is generally held,
however, that mere proof of possession of the unindorsed instrument does not make
out a primna facie case for the gift. See Rothwell v. Taylor, 303 Ill. 226, 135 N. E.
419 (1922).
' Cf. the language of the court in Campbell's Estate, 274 Pa. 546, 552, 118 Atd.
547, 548 (1922), where the court, after speaking of a gift by the indorsement of a
check, says, "A stronger presumption arises from the drawing of a check to the
order of one who sets up a gift of it."
Si re Knapp, 197 Iowa 166, 197 N. W. 22 (1924) ; Guild v. Eastern Trust &
Banking Co., 122 Me. 514, 121 Atl. 13 (1923) ; it re Swinburne, [1926] 1 Ch. 38.
Other cases are collected in Notes (1922) 20 A. L. R. 177, and (1926) 44 A. L. R.
625.
'For a very penetrating discourse on this sort of operation see Amos, The
Legal Mind (1933) 49 L. Q. Rav. 27.
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thing more substantial is due to the existence of the account with the
bank on which the check is drawn. But if no rights are created in the
drawer's claim against the bank, this is theoretically immaterial. For
general commercial purposes it has seemed desirable that no such rights
should be created and the Negotiable Instruments Law so provides.3 2
Thus policies having no relation to the question of gifts have served to
bring about the result that the gift is not upheld. That the delivery of
the check should operate as an assignment of the chose in action or a
part of it where it is intended as a gift has been the view of a few
courts that have broken away from the shackles of a theory developed
for another purpose.33 That a right should be created in the chose in
action for some purposes and not for others is perhaps not unthinkable.
When the gift is made in immediate expectation of death it is said to
be causa nortis. There is of course a striking difference in the effect of
such a gift and one inter vivos, if the donor recovers. Most cases that
are litigated, however, are those where the donor has died and the issues
are not materially different in the two situations.34 It may be noted
that occasionally the requirements are more strict where the gift is
found to be causa inortis. A statute in New Hampshire requires
two witnesses to the gift. 35 In Drew v. Hagerty36 the court indicates
that it might allow a gift inter vivos to stand on facts that would not
support a gift causa mzortis, since long acquiescence in the donee's pos-
session gives greater assurance of a 'bona fide transaction."
§189, applied in this situation in Burrows v. Burrows, 240 Mass. 485, 137
N. E. 923 (1922).
1 Carter v. Greenway, 152 Ark. 339, 238 S. W. 65 (1922) ; First National Bank
v. O'Byrne, 177 Ill. App. 473 (1913); May v. Jones, 87 Iowa, 188, 54 N. W. 231
(1893); Whsgatt v. First National Bank, 117 Minn. 9, 134 N. W. 224 (1912);
Phinney v. State, 36 Wash. 236, 78 Pac. 927 (1904). In Wasgatt v. First National
Bank, sutpra, the court also uses the language of a contract for the benefit of a
third person, the idea being apparently that the promise of the bank to the donor
to pay checks drawn by him could be enforced by the donee. This rationalization
is advocated in a Note (1926) 26 COL. L. Rav. 459. Some courts have held that
a check for the entire amount of the deposit could be enforced. Varley v. Sims,
100 Minn. 331, 111 N. W. 269 (1907) (question of the effect of check for part is
left open) ; Taylor's Estate, 154 Pa. 183, 25 Atl. 1061 (1893). The distinction be-
tween a check for the entire deposit and one for part of it does not seem sound.
It has been rejected in a number of cases. Burrows v. Burrows, 240 Mass. 485,
137 N. E. 923 (1922) ; Simmons v. Cincinnati Savings Society, 31 Ohio St. 457
(1877). In a Pennsylvania case later than Taylor's Estate, supra, the court in
upholding a gift by means of a check on a savings account for the entire balance
did not stress this fact as important. Campbell's Estate, 274 Pa. 546, 118 Atl.
547 (1922).
Of course in any jurisdiction if the check is cashed the gift is complete.
11 See Mechem, supra note 21, at 357.
3N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 297, §17.
381 Me. 231, 17 Atl. 63 (1889).
' The question was whether a declaration by the donor while the pass book was
in the donees possession would satisfy the delivery requirement. The language in
Appeal of Walsh, 122 Pa. 177, 15 Atl. 470 (1888) and in the dissenting opinion in
Thomas v. Lewis, 89 Va. 1, 15 S. E. 389 (1892) indicates a similar policy. In gen-
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If the symbol of the deposit is delivered to a third person for the
donee the result is made to depend upon whether such person is regarded
as a trustee or as an agent of the donor. The differentiating criteria are,
however, somewhat vague, and the general impression created by the
case is apt to determine the label chosen.38
In the absence of any delivery, the claimant has a remote chance
on the theory of a trust. Where the intent has been clear and the
equities strong, a court has been known to hold for the claimant on such
a theory, although there were no declarations of intent other than the
frequent one that the amount on deposit belonged to the claimant.80
If declarations can be found to the effect that the depositor was holding
the symbol of the deposit for the claimant, that would probably be of
some help on this theory. In most instances, however, courts have
refused to torture an imperfect gift into a declaration of trust.
40
Oral and Written Assignnents
In the case of a savings account where the pass book is the recog-
nized symbol of the deposit, it is obvious that an assignment without
delivery could not 'be effective against a subsequent bona fide purchaser
of the account to whom the book was delivered. Nor is it probable
that it could make the gift irrevocable any more than a declaration of
gift in the case of a chattel, since choses in action represented by symbols
are treated as chattels. In jurisdictions where the seal is still recognized
an assignment under seal might be regarded as a deed of gift, the de-
livery of which would make the assignment irrevocable.4 1 This could
also apply to checking accounts. But no cases have been found where
the issue was presented.
It is true that a claim of a gift based on a gratuitous oral assignment
presents administrative problems that are more difficult than where
there is a delivery of a symbol. They are the same from this standpoint
as mere oral expressions of donative intent. That such assignments are
eral, however, the requirements for these two classes of gifts are said to be the
same.
'Green v. Hynes, 42 Cal. App. 198, 183 Pac. 568 (1919) (agent); Spellacy v.
Dauterman, 122 Cal. App. 416, 10 Pac. (2d) 114 (1932) (trustee).
'Harris Banking Co. v. Miller, 190 Mo. 640, 89 S. W. 629 (1905). In Citizen's
National Bank v. McKenna, 168 Mo. App. 254, 153 S. W. 521 (1913), this case was
distinguished on the ground that in the Miller Case there was expressed the inten-
tion that the amount on deposit belonged to the claimant, whereas in the McKenna
Case the intention was that the claimant should have it on depositor's death. This
may be the distinction between testamentary and non-testamentary intent, but not
the distinction between a gift and a trust. Although the word "trust" need not
necessarily be used, presumably there ought to be the intent shown to act in a
fiduciary capacity.
"Eschen v. Steers, 10 F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926), and cases there cited;
Pennell v. Ennis, 126 Mo. App. 355, 103 S. W. 147 (1907) (check delivered).I See 1 WILLIs5ON, CON RACTS (1920) §440.
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revocable has been the general rule, death constituting revocation.
42
Presumably if the 'bank received notice and agreed, a novation might be
found.
43
A power of attorney to draw on the account, although in theory in
the same class as assignments 44 is more obviously no gift, as ordinarily
the depositor would expect to have the right to revoke. Generally such
a power of attorney is of course revocable 45 and where this is the ar-
rangement, the intent of the donor to reserve no control would seem to
be immaterial. An exception is the case of Murphy v. Bordwell.
4 6  It
appeared there, however, that the cashier, in having the donor sign the
power of attorney did not carry out her expressed wish which was to
transfer-the entire account to the donee. The decision is apparently
prompted by equitable considerations arising out of this mistake.
An assignment written and signed, and delivered by the depositor,
might well be upheld with little fear of fraud. Yet on strict theory if
an assignment is revocable it apparently makes no difference whether
it is written or oral. However, it is possible that there is a tendency in
the direction of upholding gratuitous assignments in writing.47 Gifts of
bank deposits by this method are seldom attempted.
Deposit in the Name of Clainant
On its face, a deposit in the name of the claimant would seem to be
sufficient to complete the gift so that there could be no question about
the validity of the claim whether or not the donee has knowledge of the
deposit. The bank by accepting the deposit in this form might be re-
garded as promising to pay to the person in whose name the account
"This is the rule generally as to choses in action. Adams v. Merced Stone Co.,
176 Cal. 415, 178 Pac. 498 (1917) ; Cook v. Lum, 55 N. J. L. 373, 26 Ati. 803 (Sup.
Ct." 1893) ; Wilson v. Featherston, 122 N. C. 747, 30 S. E. 325 (1898) ; Milroy v.
Lord, 4 D. G. F. & J. 264 (Ch. 1862). In the New Jersey and North Carolina
cases individuals seemed to be acting in the capacity of bankers. A case concerned
with bank deposits is In re Sieracki's Estate, 132 Misc. 407, 229 N. Y. Supp. 247
(Surr. Ct 1928).
'In Ogdon v. Washington National Bank, 82 Ind. App. 187, 145 N. E. 514
(1924), the court says that a direction by the donor to the debtor to pay to the
donee, assented to by the debtor, constitutes "delivery."
" In view of the historical development of assignments as powers of attorney.
See 7 HoLDswoRTH, HIsTORY OF ENGLISi LAW (1925) 515-544.
See O'Shea v. Sicotte, 52 Cal. App. 331, 198 Pac. 812 (1921).
"83 Minn. 54, 85 N. W. 915 (1901).
' T he A. L. I. Restatement of the Law of Contracts, §158 (1) (a), provides
that an irrevocable assignment of a right may be made by "a writing either under
seal or of such a nature as to be capable of transferring title to a chattel without
delivery thereof and without consideration". In the explanatory notes to the
official draft of this restatement two cases are cited suggesting the view that a
written assignment is sufficient. Shepard v. Shepard, 164 Mich. 183, 200, 129
N. W. 201 (1910) ; Parker v. Mott, 181 N. C. 435, 107 S. E. 500 (1921). See also
Adams v. Merced Stone Co., 176 Cal. 415, 178 Pac. 498 (1917) ; Mardis v. Steen,
293 Pa. 13, 141 AtI. 629 (1928). In England gratuitous assignments in writing are
irrevocable under the Judicature Act. See In re Westerton [1919] 2 Ch. 104.
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appears, so that the transaction could be upheld as a contract for the
benefit of a third person. Such, however, is not the view ordinarily
taken.48 The name seems to 'be thought of as a mere form, the chose
in action represented by the account still being the property of the de-
positor. In order to effect its transfer the requisites of a valid gift
must appear.
Moreover there are several reasons why the problem is not so simple.
Very frequently such deposits are for the purpose of circumventing
bank rules as to maximum deposits and others above referred to. In
many instances the intention of the depositor is to retain control over the
deposit. In Beaver v. Beaver" the court says, "To infer a gift from the
form of the deposit alone, would in a great majority of cases and espe-
cially when the deposit was of any considerable amount impute an inten-
tion which never existed and defeat the real purpose of the depositor."
These considerations could readily have been taken care of, it would
seem, by placing the burden on the claimant to show a donative intent
apart from the form of the deposit. There are some holdings to this
effect. 50 Without delivery of the pass book the gift has been upheld
either on the ground that the deposit in the claimant's name dispenses
with the requirement 5 ' or that it is indicative of a trust.5 2  But most
courts have not been content with this. They have chosen to regard the
deposit alone as insufficient to complete the gift even if accompanied by
the proper intent.5 8 That such a deposit should not dispense with the
' In Howard v. Windham County Savings Bank, 40 Vt. 597 (1868), there is a
suggestion of this doctrine in the words at 599, "The transaction (between donor
and bank) constituted an agreement, a legal privity between the bank and ...
(donee), by force of which the bank became accountable to her."
1-117 N. Y. 421, 431, 22 N. E. 940, 942 (1889).
'See Fernald v. Fernald, 80 N. H. 75, 113 Atl. 223 (1921), where it is said,
"A bank deposit, evidenced by a deposit book in the possession and control of the
depositor during his life, does not pass after his death to one in whose name it was
deposited, as a gift or trust, unless it is found that such was the intention of the
depositor." An earlier New Hampshire case had held that although there might
be a resulting trust for the depositor, this could be rebutted. Blasdel v. Locke, 52
N. H. 238 (1872). See also as to the resulting trust doctrine, Northrop v. Hale,
73 Me. 66 (1881).
ID. M. Read Co. v. American Bank & Trust Co., 110 Conn. 461, 148 Atl. 130
(1930); McKinnen v. First National Bank, 77 Fla. 777, 82 So. 748 (1919);
Succession of Zacharie, 119 La. 150, 43 So. 988 (1907) ; Gardner v. Merritt, 32
Md. 78 (1870); Supple v. Suffolk Savings Bank, 198 Mass. 393, 84 N. E, 432
(1908) ; Howard v. Windham County Savings Bank, 40 Vt. 597 (1868).
'Smith v. Ossipee Savings Bank, 64 N. H. 228, 9 Atl. 792 (1887) ; Boyle v.
Dinsdale, 45 Utah 112, 143 Pac. 136 (1914).
1 The holding to this effect is more clear-cut in the second report of Beaver v,
Beaver, 137 N. Y. 59, 32 N. E. 998 (1893). Among the cases supporting this view
are Telford v. Patton, 144 Ill. 611, 33 N. E. 1119 (1892) ; Getchell v. Biddeford
'Savings Bank, 94 Me. 452, 47 AtI. 895 (1900) ; Branch v. Dawson, 36 Minn. 193,
30 N. W. 545 (1886); Sawyer v. Mabus, 107 S. C. 369, 92 S. E. 1029 (1917).
In the Branch Case there is a suggestion that if the donor died without revoking,
the gift might be good. The discussion in Walso v. Latterner, 140 Minn. 455, 168
N. W. 353 (1918), indicates that a doctrine similar to that of the tentative trust
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delivery requirement is difficult to understand. Certainly it seems to
give fully as much assurance that the alleged donee has not built his
case on perjured testimony, as delivery of a bank book or certificate of
deposit. Indeed, testimony as to the delivery of a bank book is much
more readily fabricated since it is even possible to prove delivery when
death finds the donor in possession. 54 But since, when the book remains
in the donor's hands, he is permitted under banking rules to draw on
the fund, or at least may prevent the donee from drawing, the "control
and dominion" idea points to incompleteness. In seeking the explanation
of legal rules, moreover, we should not neglect the fortuitous. The ap-
parent force of the words, "dominion and control," to which we have
alluded, may be due to the chance circumstances of the case where a
court first was presented with the question. Beaver v. Beaver,55 a very
influential case in the establishment of the rule, happened to be one
where the alleged donee predeceased the donor, his father, leaving a
childless widow. The court may not have considered her an object of
the donor's bounty, in competition with those of his own blood.
Some courts that do not require delivery of the pass book, have
established the independent requirement that the donee must know of
the deposit and accept it.56 This would not 'be a requirement if the
doctrine of a contract for the benefit if a third person were used, nor in
the case of a gift by delivery to a third person is knowledge by the donee
necessary, since it is usually said that acceptance is presumed. The fact
of notice is, however, very material in determining the depositor's actual
purpose. It is not surprising to find that it is sometimes raised to the
dignity of an indispensable requirement.
It is to be noted that the rule requiring delivery of the pass book
has some exceptions when applied to deposits in the name of the
claimant. It has been held that if the donee is an infant, delivery is
(see infra note 66) might be applied in Minnesota to deposits in the name of
another. In Peters v. Peters, 224 Ky. 493, 6 S. W. (2d) 499 (1928), the court
held that the establishment of a commercial account in the name of the donor was
not sufficient, although there was no symbol of the deposit to deliver. For other
cases see Note (1929) 59 A. L. R. 975.
'r "Redelivery to the donor for safe-keeping does not destroy the validity of
the gift." McKenna v. McKenna, 260 Mass. 481, 157 N. E. 517 (1927). See also
Sanders v. Jarvis, 221 Ill. App. 550 (1921).
'Supra notes 49 and 53.
'mScott v. Berkshire County Savings Bank, 140 Mass. 157, 2 N. E. 925 (1885);
Supple v. Suffolk Savings Bank, 198 Mass. 393, 84 N. E. 432 (1908); Smith v.
Ossipee Savings Bank, 64 N. H. 228, 9 Atl. 792 (1887). See also Meriden Trust
& Safe Deposit Co. v. Miller, 88 Conn. 157, 90 Atl. 228 (1914). In the case of an
infant donee acceptance has been held unnecessary; although it is indicated that
otherwise it would be required. McKinnon v. First National Bank, 77 Fla. 777,
82 So. 748 (1919).
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unnecessary.57 Or delivery may not be required if the donor can be
said to hold the book as trustee for the donee.6 8
Deposit in Trust for Claimant
As a matter of substance there seems no reason to distinguish be-
tween a deposit in the name of another and one in trust for another.
Some courts-treat the two forms the same. In general this is true in
jurisdictions where delivery of a symbol is not required if the deposit is
in the name of another.59 In Massachusetts in both instances notice to
the beneficiary is made the test.00
But if there is no difference in fact between the two forms of deposit
there is a difference from the standpoint of administration. The greater
freedom and absence of formal requirements that we find in the case of
trusts generally is probably due to the absence of a jury in a chancery
court, the normal forum for trust enforcement. Elements of importance
such as delivery and notice which a court may raise to the dignity of
requirements if there is a jury to be kept within bounds, may safely be
regarded only as matters of evidence bearing on the issue of intent
where there is no jury and the appellate court has greater freedom in
reviewing issues of fact. This in the situation under discussion may
explain why courts that are strict in requiring delivery for the com-
pletion of a gift by deposit in the name of another, are content to dis-
pense with it if the question is one of the establishment of a trust.01 It is
sometimes reasoned that the retention of the symbol of the deposit is
consistent with the depositor's position as trustee.0 2
It is thus apparent that, with the exception of occasional extra re-
quirements such as notice, there is unanimity in permitting such a
deposit to create a trust if the necessary intent is shown. Differences
are to 'be found, however, in-the matter of what are usually called pre-
sumptions. Sometimes the term "prima facie evidence" is used without
any discernible difference in meaning. Thus some courts hold that if
' Collins v. Collins, 242 Ky. 5z 45 S. W. (2d) 811 (1931). Accounts in the name
of another are frequently established by a parent for his child.
' Barker v. Frye, 75 Me. 29 (1883). In one case the donor was labelled a
custodian. Kelly v. Huplits, 103 Pa. Sup. 430, 157 Atl. 704 (1931).
' Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512 (1873); Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212,
43 Atl. 43 (1899) ; Connecticut River Savings Bank v. Albee, 64 Vt. 571, 25 Atl.
487 (1892). It is probable also that in Minnesota both forms are regarded as
creating revocable gifts. See supra note 53.
1 Scrivens v. North Easton Savings Bank, 166 Mass. 255, 44 N. E. 251 (1896);
Bailey v. New Bedford Institution, 192 Mass. 564, 78 N. E. 648 (1906) ; McCaffrey
v. North Adams Savings Bank, 244 Mass. 396, 138 N. E. 393 (1923).
'Miller v. Clark, 40 Fed. 15 (C. C. D. Conn. 1889) ; Cazallis v. Ingraham, 119
Me. 240, 110 Atl. 359 (1920) ; Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134 (1878); Matter of
Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748 (1904) ; Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321,
54 At. 994 (1903); People's Savings Bank v. Webb, 21 R. I. 218, 42 Atl. 874
(1899).
2Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321, 54 Ati. 994 (1903).
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there is no evidence of intent other than the form of the deposit there
is no issue for the trier of facts, since there is a presumption that a trust
was intended.68 Others take the view that evidence of intent apart from
the form of the deposit is necessary to establish a trust.64 None goes so
far as to make the form of the deposit conclusive. 65
A few courts hold that the form of the deposit apart from a showing
of a contrary intent creates a revocable trust. This is the famous "ten-
tative trust" doctrine enunciated in Matter of Totten.66 It is there
stated as follows:
"A deposit by one person of his own money as trustee for another
standing alone does not eatablish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime
of the depositor. It is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will until
the depositor dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some un-
equivocal act or declaration such as delivery of pass book or notice to
the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary without
revocation or some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the pre-
sumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the balance."
67
However, evidence may be admitted to show that no trust at all was
intended.6 8 A sufficiently strong declaration by the donor would ap-
parently make it possible to create an irrevocable trust without delivery
of the pass book or notice to the beneficiary. On the question whether
such acts give rise to a presumption of an intention that the trust should
be irrevocable, the inferior courts of New York have been divided. 69
The Court of Appeals at first used language tending to support the view
that other evidence of intent was necessary or at least that delivery or
notice was only evidence.70 A different view is indicated, however, by
SCazallis v. Ingraham, 119 Me. 240, 110 Atl. 359 (1920); Milholland v.
Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 43 Atl. 43 (1899); Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321, 54
Atl. 994 (1903).
Walker v. Welsh, 11 N. E. 727 (Mass. 1887); Nicklas v. Parker, 69 N. 3.
Eq. 743, 61 Atl. 267 (Ct. Ch. 1905), aff'd, 71 N. J. Eq. 777, 71 Atl. 1135 (1907)
People's Savings Bank v. Webb, 21 R. I. 218, 42 Atl. 874 (1899).
'There is a suggestion of this policy in Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134 (1878).
"Supra note 61. The way was paved for this doctrine in Cunningham v.
Davenport, 147 N. Y. 43, 41 N. E. 412 (1895), where it appeared that the donee
predeceased the donor. The tentative trust doctrine is also followed in Minnesota.
See Walso v. Latterner, 140 Minn. 455, 168 N. W. 353 (1918).
179 N. Y. at 125-126, 71 N. E. at 752. Shepherd's Citations show that Mat-
ter of Totten has been cited more than 150 times. In most cases the passage here
set forth is quoted. It is treated much as if it were a statute.
Morris v. Sheehan, 234 N. Y. 366, 138 N. E. 23 (1922).
'That such acts give rise to a presumption, of such intent: Matter of Davis,
119 App. Div. 35, 103 N. Y. Supp. 946 (2d Dept. 1907); Stockert v. Dry Dock
Savings Inst., 155 App. Div. 123, 139 N. Y. -Supp. 986 (1st Dept. 1913). That they
do not: In re Halligan's Estate, 82 Misc. 30, 143 N. Y. Supp. 676 (Surr. Ct. 1913)
(tax proceeding) ; In re Reed's Estate, 89 Misc. 632, 154 N. Y. Supp. 247 (Surr.
Ct. 1915).
' Hemmerich v. Union Dime Savings Inst., 205 N. Y. 366, 98 N. E. 499 (1912);
Matthews v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 208 N. Y. 508, 102 N. E. 520 (1913).
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the affirmance of two recent Appellate Division decisions holding that
such acts create a presumption of an irrevocable trust.71
New Jersey has adopted the same view as New York on the question
of the effect of the deposit in the matter of intent. But the result is
quite different, since in New Jersey the intent that the trust should be
revocable makes it testamentary. 72 Additional evidence to show that
an irrevocable trust was intended is consequently necessary if the claim-
ant is to succeed, although no revocation has been attempted.
If the revocable trust is upheld, however, a problem of some diffi-
culty has arisen as to what constitutes revocation. Matter of Totten
states that the test is whether there has been "a decisive act of dis-
affirmance". A subsequent declaration in connection with a will drawn
up after a deposit in trust has been regarded as such a decisive act.7
A will executed subsequent to the establishment of the trust which
would require utilization of the bank deposit has likewise been so re-
garded.7 4 Other cases hold that a will is not a decisive act of disaffirm-
ance unless it makes specific reference to the bank deposit.75 These
cases have been distinguished on the ground that the former cases are
concerned with express dispositions of money, which could not be
effectuated unless the bank deposit was exhausted, while the latter in-
volve dispositions under residuary clauses. 70 A mere writing creating
another trust of property is not a decisive act of disaffirmance, even
though it would involve the money in the bank deposit for its realization,
as long as it fails specifically to mention the deposit. 77 Withdrawal of
SDavlin v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 229 App. Div. 269, 241 N. Y. Supp.
712 (1st Dept. 1930); af'd, 255 N. Y. 559, 175 N. E. 312 (1930); Hanigan v.
Wright, 233 App. Div. 82, 251 N. Y. Supp. 651 (3d Dept. 1931), aff'd, 257 N. Y.
602, 178 N. E. 813 (1931). In the former case the early Court of Appeals cases
were distinguished on the ground that they dealt solely with the right of the bank
to resist a demand for payment. It can hardly be denied, however, that the earlier
opinions seem to be considering the question as to who is beneficially entitled. A
better explanation is that the earlier language merely means that such acts are not
conclusive.
" Nicklas v. Parker, 69 N. J. Eq. 743, 61 At. 267 (Ct. Ch. 1905), aff'd, 71 N. J.
Eq. 777, 71 AtI. 1135 (1907) ; Jefferson Trust Co. v. The Hoboken Trust Co., 107
N. J. Eq. 310, 152 Atl. 374 (Ct. Ch. 1930).
"In. re Richardson's Estate, 134 Misc. 174, 235 N. Y. Supp. 747 (Surr. Ct.
1929).
-' Walsh v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 106 Misc. 628, 176 N. Y. Supp.
418 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aff'd, 192 App. Div. 908, 182 N. Y. Supp. 956 (1st Dept.
1920), af'd, 233 N. Y. 512, 135 N. E. 897 (1922); Matter of Beagan's Estate, 112
Misc. 292, 183 N. Y. Supp. 941 (Surr. Ct. 1920).
Meehan v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 213 App. Div. 807, 208 N. Y.
Supp. 325 (1st Dept. 1925), aff'd, 241 N. Y. 564, 150 N. E. 556 (1925) ; Wait v.
'Society for Political Study of New York City, 68 Misc. 245, 123 N. Y. Supp. 637
(Sup. Ct. 1910).
"In re Richardson's Estate, 134 Misc. 174, 235 N. Y. Supp. 747 (Surr. Ct.
1929).
'I re Schiffer's Estate, 142 Misc. 518, 254 N. Y. Supp. 871 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
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the entire deposit constitutes a revocation. 78 The death of the ben-
eficiary before the depositor likewise terminates the trust.79
Perhaps the tentative trust doctrine does not in practice reach results
that are greatly different from those arrived at in other jurisdictions.
As we have already seen, the prior death of the claimant has proved a
strong factor in defeating the gift. The donor has been allowed quite
freely to revoke through a holding that no valid trust was created. The
facts regarded as indicating an irrevocable trust, such as delivery of
the pass book or notice to the donee have been used by other courts as
evidentiary facts bearing on the question of intent. The result reached
by means of a tentative trust may be achieved, if the depositor dies, by
holding the trust valid; and if he lives and revokes or if the alleged
donee predeceases him, by holding no sufficient intent has been shown.
Deposit in the Name of Alleged Donor and Claimant
The joint deposit with express provision for survivorship is probably
the most common method used to make a gift of a bank deposit. It may
be noted in passing that a distinction is to 'be made between a gift of
the entire account and a gift of a joint interest. The former, if effective,
would completely and immediately divest the original depositor of all
control and give the sole ownership to the donee just as in the case of
the assignment of an account in the name of the depositor alone. Ob-
viously on no view could the creation of the joint account dispense with
any necessary formalities for the completion of the gift. Rules as to
delivery and assignment, already discussed, will govern.8 0
In the case of the gift of a joint interest with the right of survivor-
ship, however, the arrangement by its terms leaves to the depositor the
right to draw on the account while he lives. The donee may draw on
the account, qualified in the case of the savings account by the necessity
of having access to the pass book. Such joint accounts are used quite
frequently for convenience, especially checking accounts; but there are
many instances where they are only for the purpose of making a gift, it
being understood that no withdrawals will be made by the donee before
the death of the depositor.
" Matthews v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 208 N. Y. 508, 102 N. E. 520 (1913).
" Matter of U. S. Trust Co., 117 App. Div. 178, 102 N. Y. Supp. 271 (1st Dept.
1907), aff'd, 189 N. Y. 500, 81 N. E. 1177 (1907) ; Cunningham v. Davenport, 147
N. Y. 43, 41 N. E. 412 (1895).
"' Bediran v. Zorian, 287 Mass. 191, 191 N. E. 448 (1934). It should be noted
that the mere fact that a person other than the depositor is given a power of
attorney to draw on the account does not create a joint ownership of the deposit.
It has been held that the giving of a certificate of deposit reciting a deposit by
one person and payable to depositor or alleged donee gives to the alleged donee
only such a power of attorney. Jones v. Fullbright, 197 N. C. 274, 148 S. E. 229
(1929). See also Nannie v. Pollard, 205 N. C. 362, 171 S. E. (1933) (joint de-
posit). Such a power of attorney would be revoked by the depositor's death. But
see Murphy v. Bordwell, 83 Minn. 54, 85 N. W. 915 (1901).
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There is no theoretical reason why such a deposit should be treated
differently from the deposit in the name of one person alone, so far as
its effect in dispensing with the requirement of delivery or creating a
contract right in the claimant is concerned. There is the practical differ-
ence that the joint deposit is not so suitable for the use of the name of a
dummy. This may help to account for the fact that the similarity be-
tween the two situations is seldom recognized. Courts that hold deposits
in the name of another insufficient to complete the gift join with the
rest in holding that in the case of a joint deposit no delivery is neces-
sary.8 1 A few unfortunately hold to the requirement of delivery of
the pass book.
8 2
'First National Bank v. Mulich, 83 Colo. 518, 266 Pac. 1110 (1928) ; Kennedy
v. McMurray, 169 Cal. 287, 146 Pac. 647 (1915); Negaunee National Bank v.
LeBeau, 195 Mich. 502, 161 N. W. 974 (1917); McLeod v. Hennepin County
Savings Bank, 145 Minn. 299, 176 N. W. 987 (1920); Dyste v. Farmers' & Me-
chanics' Savings Bank, 179 Minn. 430, 229 N. W. 865 (1930); Burns v. Nolette,
83 N. H. 489, 144 Atl. 848 (1929); Kelly v. Beers, 194 N. Y. 49, 86 N. E. 980
(1909). In Mardis v. Steen, 293 Pa. 13, 141 Atl. 629 (1928), the gift is upheld,
stress being placed upon the signing and delivery of the signature card. Early
cases, refusing to recognize the joint deposit are distinguished on the ground that
there was no writing. As to the Pennsylvania law, see also infra notes 82 and 83.
Cases on the subject of gifts by means of joint dejosits are collected in Notes
(1927) 48 A. L. R. 189 and (1930) 66 A. L. R. 881.
Apart from statute it is usually the view of courts that follow the gift theory
that evidence of intent other than the form of the deposit is necessary. See Kelly v.
Beers, supra.
'Pearre v. Grossnickle, 139 Md. 274, 115 Atl. 49 (1921) ; Rice v. Bennington
County Savings Bank, 93 Vt. 493, 108 Atl. 708 (1919) ; Meyers v. Albert, 76 Wash.
218, 135 Pac. 1003 (1913) ; Daly v. Pacific Savings & Loan Association, 154 Wash.
249, 282 Pac. 60 (1929).
After the decision in Rice v. Bennington County Savings Bank, supra, the Ver-
mont statute was amended. See infra note 136.
In Maryland deposits in the name of the depositor and claimant in trust for
depositor and claimant are upheld. Sturgis v. Citizens National Bank, 152 Md.
654, 137 Atl. 378 (1927). Although the practice in Maryland of using the trust
form is due to banking by-laws, which were probably framed for the protection of
banks, [see Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 43 Atd. 43 (1899)] it has neverthe-
less had the effect of circumventing the rule requiring delivery to complete the
gift in the case of joint deposits. It would seem that this form of deposit might
be used effectively in jurisdictions which recognize the deposit in trust as sufficient
to complete the gift without delivery but refuse to give effect to a gift by means
of a joint deposit.
Although in Blick v. Cockins, 252 Pa. 56, 97 Atl. 125 (1916) the gift was upheld,
the later case of Grady v. Sheehan, 256 Pa. 377, 100 Atl. 950 (1917) held delivery
to be a requirement. See also Flanagan v. Nash, 185 Pa. 41, 39 Atl. 818 (1898).
Subsequently, following closely the suggestions contained in the language of Grady
v. Sheehan, the banks succeeded in devising a system that satisfied the court by
having the depositor and donee sign and seal an elaborate form on the signature
card. See Mardis v. Steen, 293 Pa. 13, 141 Atl. 629 (1928), referred to in note 81.
Thomas v. Houston, 181 N. C. 91, 106 S. E. 466 (1921) 'was concerned with a
certificate of deposit payable to depositor or plaintiff. Since it is not indicated
that it should be payable to the survivor, and since the parol evidence rule would
operate here to exclude evidence showing such intent, it would seem proper to
treat the case as the court does, as one of gift by delivery. A later North Carolina
case has construed a certificate of deposit in the form in which this one appeared
as creating only a power of attorney in a person other than the depositor. See
supra note 80.
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The most interesting development, however, is that in the case of the
joint deposit the name in which the deposit appears is looked upon by a
large number of courts as more than a mere form. The bank by accept-
ing it in the name of the depositor and another is regarded as undertak-
ing an obligation to the persons named. Thus a contract for the benefit
of a third person is established.8 3 The depositor is both promisee and
one of the beneficiaries of the contract. The donee is of course the
other beneficiary. If the claimant is a party to the transaction changing
the account from one in the name of a single depositor to a joint ac-
count, so that the promise is made to depositor and claimant jointly, a
novation is established.8 4 The Massachusetts court does not appear to
recognize that in holding for the claimant on a contract theory in the
absence of evidence showing the claimant was a party to a novation, it
is departing from its supposed view that contracts may not be enforced
by one who is not a party. It is true that, following the view held for
other types of deposits, notice to the claimant is required,8 5 but that is
not the equivalent of a promise by the bank to him, since notice may be,
and usually is, received apart from any purpose on the part of the bank
to communicate it.
On this theory, also, the question of intention is involved as on the
theory of a gift. It is probably permissible to show that the depositor
did not intend that the bank should make any payment to the claimant.8 6
At least the circumstances and oral statements of the depositor at the
time of the deposit would be material. And if the objective theory of
contracts were not adhered to, there might also be a broad inquiry into
the depositor's state of mind such as is permitted under the gift theory.
'First National Bank v. Mulich, 83 Colo. 518, 226 Pac. 1110 (1928) ; Erwin v.
Felter, 283 Ill. 36, 119 N. E. 926 (1918; Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. Van
Vlack, 310 Ill. 185, 141 N. E. 546 (1923) ; Perry v. Leveroni, 252 Mass. 390, 147
N. E. 826 (1925) ; McKenna v. McKenna, 260 Mass. 481, 157 N. E. 517 (1927) ;
New Jersey Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Archibald, 91 N. J. Eq. 82, 10 Atl.
434 (1919) ; Commercial Trust Co. v. White, 99 N. J. Eq. 119, 132 Ati. 761 (Ct.
Ch. 1926) ; Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie, 114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N. E. 373 (1926) ;
Deal's Adm'r. v. Merchants' & Mechanics' Savings Bank, 120 Va. 297, 91 S. E. 135
(1917) ; Wisner v. Wisner, 82 W. Va. 9, 95 S. E. 802 (1918). In Mardis v. Steen,
293 Pa. 13, 141 Atl. 629 (1928), cited supra notes 47, 81 and 82, an alternative
ground of decision was that the signature card for the joint deposit signed and
sealed, constituted a contract, the seal importing consideration. However, in
Reap v. Wyoming Valley Trust Co., 300 Pa. 156, 150 Atl. 465 (1930), the court
adopts the contract theory as it is usually spelled out. There was no seal and there
is no emphasis on delivery of the writing to the bank. Thus, after many vicis-
situdes, the Pennsylvania law seems finally to have reached the widely accepted
contract theory. This theory is supported in a Note (1924) 38 HARv. L. Rav. 243.
" Chippendale v. North Adams Savings Bank, 222 Mass. 499, 111 N. E. 371
(1916). See RESTATEmENT, CoNmTAcTs (1932) §425.
1Noyes v. Newburyport, 164 Mass. 583, 42 N. E. 103 (1895); Perry v.
Leveroni, 252 Mass. 390, 147 N. E. 826 (1925).
'See Commercial Trust Co. v. White, 99 N. J. Eq. 119, 132 Atl. 761 (Ct. Ch.
1926), and Reeves v. Reeves, 102 N. J. Eq. 436, 141 Atl. 175 (Ct. Ch. 1928).
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It is to be noted that this is not the question of the purpose of the
promisee frequently raised in connection with contracts for the benefit
of third persons.87 That does not go to the terms of the contract, but
only to the question as to who may enforce it. Here once it is established
that the intent was that the bank should pay the claimant, there would
be little question that the purpose was to benefit him.
It may thus be seen that in the great majority of states either on the
view that the form of the deposit serves in lieu of delivery or on the
view that it creates a contract, the claimant prevails.
A more unusual theory is that of a trust.88 Some of the cases an-
nouncing this doctrine fail to indicate the mechanics of the application;
what is the res and who is the trustee? It must be that either the de-
positor, still the owner of the chose in action, in this manner declares
himself trustee for the claimant, or the bank is the trustee.80 It has been
pointed out that in any case this is a strained application.0 0 The bank
as debtor cannot be trustee and in any event the intent to create a trust
is hard to find.0 1 To be sure courts have never been too insistent upon
spelling out the application when the magic of the word "trust" can be
used to help out a difficult doctrinal situation, but in this case there seem
to be other plausible alternatives offering a way out.
In the great majority of jurisdictions the law of joint tenancies ap-
plicable to property has never been regarded as raising any problems.
Apparently the view has been that this learning is a relic of the feudal
system and has no application to joint contract rights. Clearly this is
sound. The word "joint" in connection with choses in action has led
in some instances to confusion. The analogies of the property law are
undoubtedly responsible for the entirely unnecessary and troublesome
rule of survivorship for joint obligations. But even here the effect of
See RFSTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §133.
' Booth v. Oakland Bank of Savings, 122 Cal. 19, 54 Pac. 370 (1898) ; Ladner
v. Ladner, 128 Miss. 75, 90 So. 593 (1922). The California court, however, sub-
sequently upheld the gift without reference to the trust theory, where it appeared
that both depositor and claimant executed the agreement establishing the joint
deposit. See Kennedy v. McMurray, 169 Cal. 287, 146 Pac. 647 (1915). Although
New Jersey follows the contract theory there are some suggestions of the trust
theory in this jurisdiction. See Hoboken Bank for Savings v. Schwoon, 62 N. J.
Eq. 503, 50 At. 490 (Ct. Ch. 1901) ; New Jersey Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v.
Archibald, 91 N. J. Eq. 82, 108 Atl. 434 (1919). This theory is not to be confused
with the trust as used in Maryland, where the deposit is stated to be in trust for the
parties jointly. See smpra notes 20 and 82.
'In Booth v. Oakland, 122 Cal. 19, 54 Pac. 370 (1898), cited supra note 88, the
bank is regarded as the trustee. In Ladner v. Ladner, 128 Miss. 75, 90 So. 593
(1922), cited supra note 88, the depositor is apparently considered as having de-
clared himself trustee.
'o Note (1924) 38 HARv. L. REv. 243.
' In McGillivray v. First National Bank, 56 N. D. 152, 217 N. W. 150 (1927),
the trust theory is carefully considered and rejected on the ground that the bank
as debtor cannot be trustee.
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the rule is for the most part confined to the relations between the debtor
and the obligees. The rules does not necessarily affect the rights of
obligees among themselves as it does in the case of joint tenants of
property. 92 And in every other respect the relations of obligees and
third persons other than the obligor are comparable to those of tenants
in common in property law rather than to those of joint tenants. The
interests need not be equal, and the interest of each joint obligee is
assignable. The unities of joint tenancies have no place whatever here,
nor is there a need for any separate conception of choses in action held
in common as distinguished from those held jointly.
In spite of these considerations, however, several courts have had
to struggle to prevent the word "joint" from letting loose the learning
as to joint tenancies of property and in at least one jurisdiction it has
broken through with unfortunate results. The difficulty has sometimes
been taken care of by recognizing that such a deposit does not create
a technical joint tenancy in the common law sense.93 But the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine in the case of Appeal of Garland9" reached the
result that there could be no survivorship in the case of a joint deposit,
although expressly provided for, on the perverted reasoning that the
absence of the essential unities prevented the creation of a joint tenancy.
The court intimates that a tenancy in common might exist in the deposit
in the name of two persons to the extent that each contributed to the
deposit from his own funds, but the view was that the attempt to create
a joint tenancy was ineffective; no interest could therefore presently
pass, and the provision for survivorship was testamentary. This de-
cision led to legislative correction, but the statute enacted, as will sub-
sequently be pointed out, is rather narrow in scope. 95
A questionable result has also been reached in a few cases on the
ground that the words used in making the deposit were inapt to create
a joint tenancy with the result that no interest passed and the gift was
defeated. Thus the use of the word "or" connecting the names of the
joint obligees was regarded as insufficient although it is indicated that
if the conjunction "and" had been used, a joint tenancy would have been
'Jepson v. Killian, 151 Mass. 593, 24 N. E. 856 (1890). See RESTATEmENT,
CONTRACTS (1932) §132, comment A.
'Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. Van Vlack, 310 Ill. 185, 141 N. E. 546
(1923); Burns v. Nolette, 83 N. H. 489, 144 Atl. 848 (1929); New Jersey Title
Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Arclibald, 91 N. J. Eq. 82, 108 Ati. 434 (1919). This
has been recognized also in tax cases. Blodgett Union and New Haven Trust
Company, 111 Conn. 165, 149 Atl. 790 (1930) ; Marble v. Treasurer & Receiver
General, 245 Mass. 504, 139 N. E. 442 (1923).
"' 126 Me. 84, 136 Atl. 459 (1927). See also Thompson, J., dissenting in Illinois
Trust & Savings Bank v. Van Vlack, 310 I1. 185, 141 N. E. 546 (1923).
1 See infra note 133.
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created.9 6 Apart from the artificiality of the construction, these de-
cisions are open to the objection that the alternative to a joint tenancy
would be a tenancy in common, and the distinction in the case of
obligations should be immaterial.
Indeed the whole issue in the law of property has been between joint
tenancies and tenancies in common. Limitations on joint tenancies by
reason of statutes, 97 the requirement of the unities and the use of proper
words for their creation have all been concerned with this issue. And
in any case where words providing for survivorship have been used, the
issue as to the form of the tenancy has become irrelevant, since to give
effect to the intention of the parties, it has been easy, where for some
reason the joint tenancy failed, to construe the provisions as creating life
estates with contingent remainders or more properly, tenancies in com-
mon in fee with executory limitations.98 Thus even if the property
law were applicable to joint bank deposits, it ought not to affect the
usual case where survivorship is provided for.
If a joint deposit is made without express survivorship provision, it
seems that rights in the deposit would depend upon the intention of the
depositor under either the gift or the contract theory. Even if a joint
obligation is created, although the survivor is legally entitled, the ben-
eficial interest should depend upon the arrangements between the parties.
Since apart from statute the gift or the beneficiary's contract right is
subject to defeat by showing that the requisite intent is lacking, the
presence or absence of survivorship language would appear to go only
to the matter of proof. 99
The tendency to give effect to a gift by means of a joint deposit
without delivery of any symbol of the deposit is due in large part to
' Morristown Trust Co. v. Capstick, 90 N. J. Eq. 22, 106 Atl. 391 (Ct. Ch. 1919),
aff'd s.n., Morristown Trust Co. v. Safford, 91 N. J. Eq. 152, 108 Atl. 926 (1919) ;
Commercial Trust Co. v. White, 99 N. 3. Eq. 119, 132 Atl. 761 (Ct. Ch. 1926).
See also Reeves v. Reeves, 102 N. J. Eq. 436, 141 Atl. 175 (Ct. Ch. 1928).
11 Some courts have discussed the effect of statutes abolishing the incident of
survivorship or making joint tenancies tenancies in common, but such statutes have
not been regarded as preventing survivorship if that was the intent of the depositor.
Malone v. Sullivan, 136 Kan. 193, 14 P. (2d) 647 (1932); Wisner v. Wisner, 82
W. Va. 9, 95 S. E. 802 (1918). Cases are collected in Note (1933) 85 A. L. R. 282.
sTIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 365. See Burns v. Nolette, 83 N. H.
489, 144 Atl. 848 (1929).
' Engelbrecht v. Engelbrecht, 323 IIl. 208, 153 N. E. 827 (1926); Matter of
Bolin, 136 N. Y. 177, 32 N. E. 626 (1892); Corcoran v. Hotaling, 164 App. Div.
75, 148 N. Y. Supp. 302 (lst Dept. 1914) ; Deal's Admr. v. Merchants' & Mechanics'
Savings Bank, 120 Va. 297, 91 S. E. 135 (1917). In Wayne County Savings Bank
v. Smith, 194 Mich. 151, 160 N. W. 472 (1916), the deposit appeared in the name
of a wife, but the husband's name appeared on the signature book. It was held
that the evidence did not show an .intention that the account should be joint with
the right of survivorship.
In In. re Reed's Estate, 89 Misc. 632, 154 N. Y. Supp. 247 (Surr. Ct. 1915), it
is said that where there are no words of survivorship and no intention is shown
apart from the form of a deposit there is a tenancy in common.
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practical demands. The doctrine of Beaver v. Beaver 0 0 made useless
the deposit in the name of the donee to accomplish such a purpose in
some jurisdictions. The joint deposit with its clear recognition of the
right of withdrawal in the depositor combined with the survivorship
feature seemed on its face to be ideally suited to the needs of a depositor
for disposing of his property on death in a simple and informal fashion.
The semi-publicity of the transaction and the indisputable character of
bank records have constituted safeguards against false claims. Sub-
merged and treacherous legal obstacles have tended to crumble in the
face of these considerations.
III. THE STATUTE OF WILLS
There are many shades of intent. It is doubtful if donors as a rule
are careful to distinguish in their own minds between a present gift in
contemplation of death and one effective on death. In nearly all gifts
apart from weddings, Christmas and birthdays, the thought of death is
a factor. Certainly this is true if the amount is substantial. Nearly
always, also, there must be the thought that the property in question
should be available to the donor in case of necessity. If the statute of
wills were so popular with the judges that they yearned to apply it to
defeat a clearly revealed intent and a worthy claimant, most gifts would
probably fail. For no matter how well the formal requirements are
satisfied, whether by delivery of a proper symbol or by the other means
suggested, a testamentary intent will defeat the gift. Actually few fail
on this ground. It is practically impossible to show a testamentary in-
tent by evidence of oral declarations when there has been delivery of a
symbol. But written directions that the claimant should have the money
on the depositor's death are not easily sidestepped, and courts may find
it necessary to refuse to uphold the gift when such appear.1° 1 Never-
theless, in Union Trust & Savings Bank v. Tyler,10 2 although the writ-
ten direction on the books of the bank and on the pass book provided for
payment to claimant in the event of donor's death, very meager evidence
at the time of delivery of the pass book was regarded as indicating a
change of intent at that time. In Eaton v. Blood,10 3 it appeared that the
donor had delivered the pass book to a third person with written direc-
tions to make delivery to the claimant "in case anything happened (to
donor) without going to law". Other evidence showed a purpose to
control the account for her own use during her lifetime. It was said
1 Supra notes 49 and 53.
"0 Stevenson v. Earl, 65 N. J. Eq. 721, 55 AtI. 1091 (1903) ; Grady v. Sheehan,
256 Pa. 377, 100 Atl. 950 (1917) ; Steffen v. Davis, 52 S. D. 283, 217 N. W. 221
(1927).
10 161 Mich. 561, 126 N. W. 713 (1910).11201 Iowa 834, 208 N. W. 508 (1926).
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that "it is not essential to the validity of the gift that the donor re-
linquish all authority or even all interest in the subject of it." The
result might be explained as a present gift of the principal with enjoy-
ment postponed until death.
Moreover, the reservation of a right to revoke the gift does not
necessarily have the effect of making it testamentary. This is illustrated
by gifts causa mortis. Such gifts must be in immediate expectation of
death, are ineffective if the donor fails to die from the cause at that time
foreseen, and in any event are revocable before death. They do not,
however, constitute exceptions to the statute of wills. There is the
highly artificial distinction between the intent to make a gift effective
on death and the intent presently to confer title subject to a power to
revoke. The former is testamentary. Any donor who on his death bed
had such a distinction in his mind could be said to have lived and died
a confirmed legalist. Yet cases have turned on the distinction.
104
Actually of course such cases have involved the construction of certain
declarations in writing.
Gifts by deposit in the name of another, when recognized, and by
deposits in trust also present problems under the statute of wills. The
reservation of the right to interest on the deposit during the donor's life
is not inconsistent with the passing of a present interest in the principal
to take effect in possession upon the donor's death,' 0 5 but such reserva-
tion may be some evidence of a testamentary intent.106
In the case of a trust we have seen that it is a matter of intent
whether there is an irrevocable trust, a revocable trust or no trust at
all.' 0 7 Likewise deposits in the name of another, where recognized, fall
into the same classes. The problem under the statute of wills arises of
course in the case of an intent of the second type. A similar question
is involved when the right to withdraw sums on deposit is retained by
the depositor, since this amounts to a right to revoke by a specific
method. Although as we have previously noted the right to revoke
alone is not usually regarded as necessarily making the disposition tes-
tamentary, nevertheless when coupled with a life interest, the power to
modify, and complete control in the depositor during his lifetime, or-
"'Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602, 2 Sup. Ct. 415, 27 L. ed. 500 (1883);
Stevenson v. Earl, 65 N. J. Eq. 721, 55 Atl. 1091 (1903) ; Steffen v. Davis, 52 S. D.
283, 217 N. W. 221 (1927). Eaton v. Blood seems to be a case of a gift inter
ivos where the distinction might well be made but the language is rather vague.
05Candee v. Connecticut Savings Bank, 81 Conn. 372, 71 Atl. 551 (1908);
Smith v. Ossipee Savings Bank, 64 N. H. 228, 9 Atl. 792 (1887) ; Boyle v. Dins-
dale, 45 Utah 112, 143 Pac. 136 (1914).
' Sherman v. New Bedford Savings Bank, 138 Mass. 581 (1885).'0'Supra notes 62-67.
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thodox views would seem to require that the gift be held invalid. 0 8
The problem is of greatest importance in jurisdictions where the prima
facie effect of a deposit in trust is to create a revocable trust. In the
leading case of Matter of Totten'09 the problem was not raised by the
facts. The question related to the depositor's right to revoke during his
lifetime and it was held that he had this right. The elaborate dictum,"10
however, which is the basis of the New York and Minnesota law on the
subject, assumes that such a disposition is valid. It solves the problem
of the statute of wills by ignoring it. :"' In New Jersey the more or-
thodox view is accepted."12 In other states the problem is of less im-
portance due to the fact that such a trust is not regarded as revocable
unless there is a direction to the 'bank or evidence of intent that it should
be revocable apart from the form of the deposit. When the question has
arisen, either because of such evidence or an express reservation of the
right of withdrawal, the courts have divided.l" There is little dis-
cussion of the point, however.
Gifts by means of joint deposits are regarded as testamentary if
there is no intention that the claimant should have a present interest on
the date of the deposit. Here also liberality is the rule. Although it is
true that in the case of a joint deposit, both persons in whose names the
deposit appears have the right to make withdrawals as between such
persons and the bank; yet it would seem that the beneficial interest in
the proceeds should depend upon the agreement the depositors have
among themselves. In the case of a gift the beneficial interest would
depend upon the intention of the donor at the time of establishing the
deposit. If this should be found to be, as it usually is, that what re-
mains in the account upon his own death should be at the disposal of
1 See Scott, Trusts and the Statitte of Wills (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 521,
529-530.
o Supra note 61. ' Quoted supra, see note 67.
" The doctrine of Matter of Totten as far as it is concerned with the question
of testamentary dispositions, is discussed by Scott, supra note 108, at 540, et seq.
See also Dyste v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Savings Bank, 179 Minn. 430, 229 N. W.
865 (1930).
21 Nicklas v. Parker, 69 N. J. Eq. 743, 61 Atl. 267 (Ct. Ch. 1905), aff'd, 71
N. J. Eq. 777, 71 Ati. 1135 (1907) ; Jefferson Trust Co. v. The Hoboken Trust Co.,
107 N. J. Eq. 310, 152 Atl. 374 (Ct. Ch. 1930).
"'McEvoy v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, 201 Mass. 50, 87 N. E. 465
(1909) (revocable trust held testamentary). Littig v. Mt. Calvary Church, 101
Md. 494, 61 Atl. 635 (1905) (revocable trust held not testamentary). In the fol-
lowing cases involving the right of withdrawal, deposits in the name of another
were held not to be testamentary: Lehman v. Broyles, 155 Ark. 593, 245 S. W.
24 (1922) (donor reserved right to check on the account) ; Appeal of Buckingham,
60 Conn. 143, 22 Atl. 509 (1891) ("Only donor has power to draw") ; Eastman v.
Woronoco Savings Bank, 136 Mass. 208 (1884) ("Subject to the order of donor").
Nor does the delivery by the donee to the donor of signed withdrawal orders have
that effect. Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Miller, 88 Conn. 157, 90 Atl.
228 (1914).
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the donee, that in the meantime he should have the right to withdraw
for his own use such sums as he pleased and that the donee should not
make any withdrawals until his death, it is undeniable that some tes-
tamentary elements are present. It is held by some courts that the gift
may be defeated on such a showing. 114 If further, the account happens
to be in a savings bank and control is retained by possession of the pass
book, the bare right to withdraw if possession of the pass book should be
secured is the only present interest discernible. The testamentary char-
acter of such a disposition is accentuated if the claimant does not even
know of the deposit. Doubtless these are elements bearing on the issue
of testamentary intent. Occasionally the view is taken that regardless
of other elements, the mere reservation of the right to withdraw defeats
the gift."05
Most courts, however, have not taken so strict a view. Without
much analysis it is assumed that the right to withdraw includes the right
to appropriate the sums withdrawn. The establishment of the account
creates a joint ownership with equal rights as to withdrawals and thus
a present interest passes." 0 It has been said that the donor's purpose
that the donee should h ,ve the benefit of the account upon the former's
death and that no withdrawals should 'be made during his life "would
simply go to the expected exercise . . . of legal rights rather than to the
existence itself of those rights."i 7 In First National Bank v. Muiich"18
"Noyes v. Newburyport, 164 Mass. 583, 42 N. E. 103 (1895) ; Battles v. Mill-
bury Savings Bank, 250 Mass. 180, 145 N. E. 55 (1924); McGillivray v. First
National Bank, 56 N. D. 152, 217 N. W. 150 (1927). The Massachusetts court, as
in the case of other types of deposits, stresses the necessity of notice. In Grady v.
Sheehan, 256 Pa. 377, 100 Atl. 950 (1917), although withdrawals were permitted by
the alleged donee during the depositor's life, a further provision in writing accom-
panying the deposit to the effect that the survivor should have the entire balance
on death to pay debts, funeral expenses and make distribution in a certain way,
was held to make the disposition testamentary.
Clark v. Bridges, 163 Ga. 542, 136 S. E. 444 (1927) (donee did not know of
the deposit but the language is broad) ; Rose v. Osborne, 133 Me. 497, 180 Atl. 315
(1935). Where the form of the deposit is to the depositor or in case of death to
the claimant, it would seem to be clearly testamentary. Vercher v. Roy, 171 La.
524, 131 So. 658 (1930).
' Negaunee National Bank v. LeBeau, 195 Mich. 502, 161 N. W. 974 (1917);
Industrial Trust Co. v. Scanlon, 26 R. I. 228, 58 Atd. 786 (1904); McLeod v.
Hennepin County Savings Bank, 145 Minn. 299, 176 N. W. 987 (1920). In Burns
v. Nolette, 83 N. H. 489, 144 At. 848 (1929), it is said: "The question is whether,
admitting another to an equal control, but without retaining a right in the donor
to the funds withdrawn by the donee, is such a divesting of the donor's control as
satisfies the test before stated. It seems to us that it is. The donee's present right
is complete. He can draw from the account so long as funds remain. That right
is what was given to him. It might subsequently prove valueless, if the donor
withdrew the whole deposit. But for what it was worth it was a completed gift.
No further act of the donor was required. No act of hers could defeat the right,
although she might render it of no value. On the other hand, he could destroy her
reserved right by a like proceeding."
7 Kelly v. Beers, 194 N. Y. 49 at 59, 86 N. E. 980 at 984' (1909).1883 Colo. 518, 266 Pac. 1110 (1928).
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where the directions to the bank expressly stated that withdrawals were
only to be made by the donee in case of the depositor's death, it was said
that "the word 'joint' is proof that the transfer of a present interest was
intended."
Most courts that have adopted the contract theory previously dis-
cussed have usually found no problem under the statute of wills." 9
The fact that a contract right is newly created, although conditional, has
made it appear that a present interest inevitably arises. It is a contract
for the benefit of a third person of the donee-beneficiary type where
performance is postponed until the promisor's death, and the power to
revoke is reserved. It is apparent that this is descriptive of an insurance
policy where there is a right to change the beneficiary. There has never
been any suggestion that this is testamentary. Nevertheless the fact
that in the case of the joint bank deposit there is a definite sum payable
to someone presently as well as upon death of the depositor gives it a
different appearance. At any rate the transaction, so analyzed, has
sometimes been questioned on this ground.
12 0
IV. LEGISLATION
Statutes have been enacted in many jurisdictions for the protection
of banks in making payments. 12 ' These apply to deposits in the name
of another,' 22 to deposits in trust, 123 and to joint deposits.124 They
"Erwin v. Felter, 283 Ill. 36, 119 N. E. 926 (1918); New Jersey Title Guar-
hntee & Trust Co. v. Archibald, 91 N. J. Eq. 82, 103 At. 434 (1919) ; Cleveland
Trust Co. v. Scobie, 114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N. E. 373 (1926); Deal's Adm'r. v.
Merchants' & Mechanics' Savings Bank, 120 Va. 297, 91 S. E. 135 (1917) ; Wisner
v. Wisner, 82 W. Va. 9, 95 S. E. 802 (1918). In Kaufman v. Edwards, 92 N. J.
'Eq. 554, 113 AtI. 598 (Ct. Ch. 1921), however, the Vice-chancellor assumes that
after the Archibald Case it would still be possible to defeat the gift by showing a
testamentary intent. In First National Bank v. Mulich, 83 Colo. 518, 266 Pac. 1110
(1928), the court struggles with the statute of wills in discussing the case on the
gift theory, but when it turns to the contract theory it is assumed that there is no
problem of testamentary intent.
I See McGillivray v. First National Bank, 56 N. D. 152, 217 N. W. 150 (1927),
where the court takes the position that admitting a contract was made with the
bank for the benefit of the claimant the statute of wills would be an objection.
In Massachusetts, although the contract theory is accepted, it would apparently be
possible to defeat the gift if the intent is testamentary. See McKenna v. McKenna,
260 Mass. 481, 157 N. E. 517 (1927).
' For an example of the case where a bank was compelled to pay twice see
Smith v. Planters' Savings Bank, 124 S. C. 100, 117 S. E. 312 (1923).
1 The New York statute is typical. "When any deposit shall be made by or in
the name of any minor, the same shall be held for the exclusive right and benefit
of such minor, and free from the control or lien of all other persons, except
creditors, and shall be paid together with interest thereon to the person in whose
name the deposit shall have been made, and the receipt or acquittance of such
minor shall be a valid and sufficient release and discharge for such deposit or any
part thereof to the bank." CONS. LAws OF N. Y. (Cabill, 1930) c. 3, §148. Many
also cover deposits in the name of a married woman. See PA. STAT. (1920)
§19761.
2n Such a statute was enacted in New York in 1875, and has since been copied
with some variations in many other states. The most common form, which is
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have been passed at various times and are not uniform with respect to
different types of deposits. Those applying to deposits in the name of
another are limited in their operation to deposits for minors or married
women and protect payments before the depositor's death as well as
those thereafter. Apparently the purpose was to eliminate the difficul-
ties arising from the fact that so many deposits are made for persons
under disabilities of infancy or coverture and it would otherwise be un-
safe to pay the amount of the deposit to them.
Statutes applying to deposits in trust and most of those applying to
joint deposits are also for the protection of banks. The former protect
only payments after the death of the trustee. By the New York statute
applying to joint deposits protection is expressly withdrawn when the
bank has notice not to pay.125 Apart from such provision it is arguable
that payment could safely be made regardless of contest, but on the
advice of general counsel for the American Bankers Association
1 20 it
is everywhere the practise to resort to interpleader when there are con-
flicting claims.
None of the statutes of this type has had much effect upon the
question as to who is beneficially entitled to the amount on deposit.
Those applying to deposits in the name of another are so limited in their
application that no results are discernible on this point. In the matter
of formal requirements there has never been any question as to the
deposit in trust and the jurisdictions where the joint deposit has been
regarded as deficient in this respect are so few that the problem does
not seem to have arisen. In a few states such statutes have been con-
recommended by the American Bankers' Association, is as follows: "Whenever
any deposit shall be made in (specify institutions) by any person in trust for
another, and no other or further notice of the existence and terms of a legal and
valid trust shall have been given in writing to the bank, in the event of the death
of the trustee, the same, or any part thereof, together with the dividends or interest
'thereon, may be paid to the person for whom said deposit was made." 1 PATON,
DIGEST (1926) 310, Opinion 1871. Paton's Digest lists 31 states where such
statutes have been enacted up to 1926. See map No. 11 in Vol. 1. For a list of
states with citations and variations, see 2 PAToN, DIGEST (1926) 1576-1577,
Opinion 1871a.
'The form recommended by the American Bankers' Association is as follows:
"When a deposit has been made or shall hereafter be made, in any (specify insti-
tutions) transacting business in this State in the names of two persons, payable
to either, or payable to either or the survivor, such deposit, or any part thereof, or
any interest or dividend thereon, may be paid to either of said persons, whether
the other be living or not; and the receipt or acquittance of the person so Paid
shall be a valid and sufficient release and discharge to the bank for any payment
so made." 1 PATON, DIGEST (1926) 301, Opinion 1809.
Paton's Digest lists 39 states and Alaska where such statutes in some form
have been enacted up to 1926. See Map No. 3 in Vol. 1. For a list of states with
citations and variations see 2 PATON, DIGEsT (1926) 1563-1564, Opinion 1809a.
LSee CONS. LAws or N. Y. (Cahill, 1930) §§148, 249. Most statutes, however,
contain no such exception.
1- 1 PATON, DIGEST (1926) 303, Opinions 1824 and 1825.
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strued to create presumptions of intent that would not otherwise arise
from the form of the deposit.127 But the majority of courts both in
the matter of intent and application of the statute of wills have held
that this legislation did not change the existing law as far as the rights
of contesting claimants among themselves are concerned. 128
In the field of joint deposits, statutes have been enacted in a few
jurisdictions which may 'be regarded as going beyond the purpose merely
of protecting banks. They describe the persons in whose names the
deposit is made as joint tenants and specifically provide for the right of
survivorship.129  Such a statute would seem to obviate difficulties as to
the form of the deposit, but it has never been put to a real test in this
respect due to the fact that courts in these jurisdictions have upheld the
gift independently of the statute. It has been used, however, as an
alternative ground of decision.1 30 And this type of statute has been
held to make a deposit in this form presumptive evidence of intent to
make a present gift.13
Three statutes are sufficiently unique to merit independent mention.
The amendment to the Maine statute enacted following the decision ad-
verse to the claimant in Appeal of Garland'3 2 expressly provides that
for an account in the name of husband or wife, parent or child, not ex-
ceeding $3000, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, neither the
testamentary character of the intent nor the absence of a technical joint
tenancy should prevent the survivor from taking. 3 3 This eliminates
objections to a gift covered by the statute based on its testamentary
character or deficiencies in form. The limitation as to amount indicates
the desire to recognize "the poor man's will". The exception as to
fraud or undue influence would indicate that the legislature had in mind
'Kuck v. Ruftery, 117 Cal. App. 755, 4 Pac. (2d) 552 (1931); Dyste v.
Farmers' & Mechanics' Savings Bank, 179 Minn. 430, 229 N. W. 865 (1930).
' Clark v. Bridges, 163 Ga. 542, 136 S. E, 444 (1927) ; Gordon v. Toler, 83
N. J. Eq. 25, 89 Atl. 1020 (Ct. Ch. 1914) ; Reeves v. Reeves, 102 N. J. Eq. 436,
141 AtI. 175 (Ct. Ch. 1928). See also cases collected in Note (1927) 48 A. L. R.
189, 202.
'Joint tenancies are expressly created by the statutes in California, Colorado,
Michigan, Missouri, New York, Washington, Wisconsin and West Virginia. See
2 PATON, DIGEST (1926) 1563-1564.
' Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. Van Vlack, 310 Ill. 185, 141 N. E. 546
(1923). The Illinois statute does not expressly refer to "joint tenants," but much
the same effect is reached by including the clause as a proviso to the section
dealing with joint tenancies.
'In re Rehfeld's Estate, 198 Mich. 249, 164 N. W. 372 (1917) ; Mississippi
Valley Trust Co. v. Smith, 320 Mo. 989, 9 S. W. (2d) 58 (1928) ; Clary v. Fitz-
gerald, 155 App. Div. 659, 140 N. Y. Supp. 536 (4th Dept. 1913), aff'd, 213 N. Y.
696, 107 N. E. 1075 (1915). It is suggested in'Peoples' State Bank v. Miller's
Estate, 198 Mich. 783, 165 N. W. 608 (1917) that this statute obviates the objection
of the statute of wills, but it would seem that the thought was that this is accom-
plished by the creation of a presumption that a present interest passes.
Supra note 94.
ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 57, §25 (Laws of Maine 1929, c. 307).
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that otherwise the form of the deposit should also be conclusive on the
question of intent. The limitation to husband and wife or parent and
child has 'been unfortunate.8
4
Another statute of special interest was enacted in Vermont in 1923
following the decision in Rice v. Bennington County Savings Bank.8 0
It was designed primarily to correct the situation created by the holding
in the case that, regardless of the depositor's intent, a joint deposit was
insufficient to perfect the gift without delivery. The language of the
statute is as follows:
"The recital of the words 'payable to either or to the survivor' or
words of like effect in the order creating such account and signed by the
person or persons who furnish the funds for such deposit shall be con-
clusive evidence, as between the payees and their legal representatives,
of the creation of an absolute joint account: but nothing herein shall
prevent the proof of fraud, undue influence, or incapacity, to defeat such
joint interests.' 13
It will be noted that this statute does not clearly accomplish its pur-
pose since nothing is said as to the effect of an "absolute joint account".
On the other hand if it means that there is a complete irrevocable gift,
it goes further than necessary to bring it into line with majority hold-
ings. For on this view it appears to preclude evidence that the de-
positor's intent was other than donative. Since it contains no language
susceptible of the construction that it is limited to cases arising after
the death of a depositor, there is a serious question as to what it could
mean as applied to a contest while both live. A possible view is that
each is entitled to one half of the amount on deposit. A more sensible
solution would be that, although the evidence is conclusive as to the
joint deposit with the right of survivorship, the "absolute joint deposit"
does not preclude a showing of the intent of the depositor as to the
beneficial interest in the deposit during the joint lives of the persons in
whose names the deposit appears. The court in Patch v. Squires'
8 7 is
content to hold that the statute dispenses with the delivery requirement,
refusing to enter upon any general discussion of its effect upon existing
law.
The other statute to be considered is that of New York. Prior to
1914 the statute applicable to all banks, was in the form indicated in
the second group above mentioned describing the persons in whose
' In Rose v. Osborne, 133 Me. 497, 180 At. 315 (1935), the survivor, a nephew
of the depositor, was defeated principally because the intent was testamentary.
There is a reference to the lack of unities. It is interesting that a deposit in trust
on otherwise the same facts was upheld.
193 Vt. 493, 108 Atl. 708 (1919).
Public Laws of Vermont (1933) §6722.
105 Vt. 405, 165 Atl. 919 (1933).
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names the joint deposit appears, as joint tenants. 138 This was regarded
as creating a presumption of intent to make a present gift, but
would not exclude rebutting evidence to indicate a contrary intent or to
show that the intent was testamentary. 3 9 In the year mentioned a new
section was enacted applicable to savings banks alone. This included
in substance the provision of the old section together with a significant
addition, as follows:
"The making of the deposit in such form shall, in the absence of
fraud or undue influence, be conclusive evidence, in any action or pro-
ceeding to which either the savings bank or the surviving depositor is
a party, of the intention of 'both depositors to vest title to such deposit
and the additions thereto in such survivor. 1 40
The construction of this addition was involved in the case of
Moskowitz v. Marrow.'41 The question was whether the survivor's
interest was affected by a notice of revocation given to the bank by the
depositor prior to her death. It was held that since the survivor was
a party, the form of the deposit was conclusive on the point that the
deposit, as originally made, established an irrevocable transfer of a
present interest in the deposit, including the right of survivorship. It
was also stated in the concurring opinion of Cardozo, C. J., that while
the persons in whose name the account appeared were living, the pre-
sumption of intent to create an irrevocable interest was rebuttable; and
there is the further dictum that even after the death of one, the form of
the deposit would not be conclusive as to amounts withdrawn before
death, but only as to amounts on deposit at that time.
It will be seen that the statute itself is ambiguous in several respects.
Although inquiry is foreclosed in the designated proceedings as to the
intent at the time ofi the deposit in respect to the beneficial interest of
the survivor, the intent might be that such interest should be either revo-
cable or irrevocable and still come within the language of the statute.
The reasoning of the majority that to admit a showing of an intent that
it should be revocable nullifies the statute can scarcely be supported,
since prior thereto, it could be shown that no beneficial interest what-
ever was intended. Also the view of the concurring judge that the
presumption is conclusive only after- death involves reading something
into the statute, since the bank might be an interpleading party in a pro-
' CoNs. LAws op N. Y. (Cahill, 1930) c. 3, §148. (Laws of New York 1909,
c. 10, §144).
Clary v. Fitzgerald, 155 App. Div. 659, 140 N. Y. Supp. 536 (4th Dept. 1913),
aff'd, 213 N. Y. 696, 107 N. E. 1075 (1915).
"I CoNs. LAws or N. Y. (Cahill, 1930) c. 3, §249. (Laws of New York 1914,
c. 369).
141251 N. Y. 380, 167 N. E. 506 (1929).
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ceeding before death involving the determination of the beneficial
interest in the deposit.
Nevertheless judicial molding of awkward legislation has achieved
a desirable scheme. If it could be shown that the intent was to give
only a revocable interest, the determination of this issue would be
troublesome, and it would be necessary to decide how revocation would
have to be evidenced, with such attendant difficulties as have been noted
in connection with the tentative trust doctrine where the "decisive act"
test is employed. Under the court's construction, the administrative
difficulties resulting from throwing open the question of intent after
death which have repeatedly plagued the courts, are eliminated. Adopt-
ing some of the language of Judge Cardozo, "family settlements, made
in the informal fashion expected among relatives" are not "opened up
for scrutiny after years of acquiescence."' 142 The deposit, safeguarded
as it is by banking forms and witnessed informally by bank clerks, be-
comes subject to contest only, as in the case of a will, by the showing of
fraud or undue influence.1 43 By reason of practical advice which banks
are in a position to give, there will be few instances where intent is
defeated. At the same time under the dictum of the Chief Judge,
conclusiveness is not carried so far as to leave unprovided for the neces-
sities of a depositor while living. D5eposits for a purpose other than
donative are not wrested from the depositor because he has chosen a
form that carries implications he does not intend. Though there may
still 'be a presumption of an intent to pass a present interest in a contest
arising while he lives, practically the possibility of rebuttal gives him a
power to revoke that will scarcely ever successfully be questioned.
144
CONCLUSION
The law with respect to gifts of bank deposits by the delivery of
symbols is of long standing and for the most part satisfactory. The
burden on administration arising from obscurities in the intent issue is
great but it is one that must be shouldered. Since the middle ages it
has been recognized that the implications arising from delivery and the
fact of delivery itself are too uncertain to justify exclusive emphasis.
The light it throws on the situation is not sufficiently strong to enable a
court safely to dispense with all the help it may receive from other
" Id. at 398, 167 N. E. at 512.
1" Although the statute does not expressly so provide there can be no question
that the incapacity of the depositor may be shown. Also in In re Fenelon's Estate,
262 N. Y. 57, 186 N. E. 201 (1933), it was held that it may be shown that the
depositor did not authorize the form of the deposit.
.. Examples of the rare cases arising while the depositor lives are Frank V.
Heiman, 302 Mo. 334, 258 S. W. 1000 (1924) and People's Savings Bank v. Webb,
21 R. I. 218, 42 Atl. 874 (1899). Both of these cases involved deposits in trust.
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sources. It must remain the minimum requirement. But there is need
for extending the category of instruments whose delivery will suffice.
Checks and written assignments should be added.
In the case of deposits in the name of another, in trust, or joint
deposits, the chief need is clarification. As a rule these devices are
recognized as satisfying minimum requirements. They should always
be so regarded. Apart from statute the view that the form of the
deposit is prina facie evidence of intent to reserve a power to revoke
during life, exemplified in the New York doctrine of tentative trust,
combined with a liberal view of the statute of wills, is the most accept-
able. It is deficient, however, in that even after death it leaves open the
issue of intent. Although during the depositor's life, this is necessary,
it is undeniable that after death the interests of administration would
be served if the form of deposit were made conclusive, apart from a
showing of fraud, undue influence or incapacity. The implications
arising from the form of the deposit and the safeguards against fraud
are sufficient to justify such a rule. The policies expounded by Cardozo,
C. J., in his concurring opinion in Moskowitz v. Marrow indicate the
need. Doubtless the change made by the depositor's death in the proper
approach to the question can not be recognized by courts without the
aid of legislation.
